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ABSTRACT 
Border security has become an increasingly public topic since the events of 
September 11, 2001. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is one of the Department of 
Homeland Security’s largest and most complex components, with a priority mission of 
keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the United States (U.S.). It also has a 
responsibility for securing and facilitating trade and travel while enforcing hundreds of 
U.S. regulations, including immigration and drug laws. When CBP was created, the 
majority of the existing organization came from two legacy agencies, US Customs and 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. CBP continues today, six years after this 
merger, to have difficulty synergizing its activities. Research has shown that policies 
have not been amalgamated, strategies are not aligned and missions are not yet 
integrated. There is evidence to suggest that CBP has a great deal of improvement to 
make before achieving synergy. This thesis argues that doctrine development would be of 
great value to the organization, but CBP must first become a learning organization, which 
includes much more than just doctrine.  
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Since its inception in 2003, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has 
conducted multiple homeland security missions and activities that require coordination 
among its offices and partners to address a spectrum of threats. Accomplishments have 
been made to harmonize border security operations at the field level within CBP. To 
enhance the collective border security effort and to eliminate gaps in operational mission 
performance, clear lines of authority must be established, approaches and terminology 
standardized and collaborative plans and policies developed through leveraging best 
practices; essentially, what doctrine is supposed to do. Doctrine, in this context, can be 
defined as a shaping instrument. It facilitates readiness and increased efficiency and 
effectiveness by standardizing ideology and applying that to practices. Doctrine shows 
“how” partners can align their processes and procedures in coordinating activities, which 
serves to institutionalize an organization’s unifying principles and priorities. Doctrine is a 
guide, not a set of hard and fast rules.  
Securing America's borders from those that would do it harm is CBP’s top 
priority. CBP deploys the U.S. Government’s largest law enforcement work force to 
protect America at and between the Ports of Entry. A Port of Entry is a term used to 
describe a legal point of entry into the U.S. from a foreign country at the international 
boundary. A Port of Entry includes locations considered as functional equivalents of the 
border, such as an airport. Between these legal points of entry lies a vast open area where 
illegal cross border activity is possible. The U.S. Border Patrol agency patrols this area. 
The scope of this mission represents an enormous responsibility for CBP—one that 
requires communication and collaboration via a defined structure from the CBP 
Commissioner cascading down to the agents in the field.  
The bottom line is that no doctrine exists to link CBP strategies; different 
planning methodologies, reporting formats, and terms of reference also exist. The CBP 
headquarters environment currently fosters independent strategic, operational and tactical 
planning, limited operational and intelligence function, independent budget formulation, 
independent chains of command for reporting and leadership purposes, as well as 
independent program and policy direction. In short, each component office performs all 
of these functions solely for their individual purposes with little attention paid to 
integrating with the rest of the organization or interest in knowing if a better way exists to 
accomplish these tasks.  
 
 
Figure 1.   CBP Organizational Chart 
A. BACKGROUND 
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Approximately 20 component offices comprise CBP. Each office not only has the 
overall mission of CBP to address, but has distinct individual responsibilities as well. 
Unfortunately, each component does not fully understand nor adhere to a common set of 
principles that could serve as “glue” to bind the current division. The lack of a unified 
CBP prevents a broad, comprehensive and integrated approach to border security. For 
instance, CBP has differing areas of responsibility throughout its field organizational 
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structure. The Office of Field Operations (OFO) and the Office of Border Patrol (OBP) 
geographical field offices (a designated geographical area that encompasses several Ports 
of Entry) and sector boundaries (a designated geographical boundary that encompasses a 
number of border patrol stations) are not aligned. In addition, a number of policies have 
yet to be updated with language that applies to the merged organization rather than the 
legacy agency from which it came. For example, two separate unions exist within CBP; 
one for the Border Patrol, specifically, and another for the rest of the organization. Also, 
incongruent performance ratings systems exist within the organization, and a policy has 
not been developed to standardize that process as of yet. Due to the many varied 
functions of the organization, a standardized performance rating system has not been 
established. Some component offices use a pass/fail performance rating system with little 
incentive for an employee to strive for a particular goal; as none has been established for 
them. No specific performance requirements are built into the rating system to work 
toward or accomplish these goals, as the rating system is generic. In the senior executive 
levels, the performance measurement system is much more efficient in describing 
specific goals and objectives to be attained by the employee, which is specific to an 
employee’s required obligations within a component.  
CBP uses strategy and policy to provide guidance. In Protecting America; U.S. 
customs and border protection 2005–2010 strategic plan, CBP outlines its strategy. The 
issue is a lack of focus on inter-related functions. In other words, what one component 
does is related to what other components do in relation to the overall mission. The 
accomplishment of CBP to meet its goals and objectives depends on the success of its 
components as a whole, not individually. Each agency under CBP understands and works 
toward accomplishing the overall mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons 
from entering the U.S. However, nothing exists to describe how to perform functions 
collaboratively and the policies and missions of the component offices do not facilitate 
the integration of tasks and purpose. 
CBP's Strategic Plan describes ways in which each component should become 
more effective and efficient in accomplishing its mission. The plan calls for integration of 
federal inspection elements at the Ports of Entry, which include combining immigration 
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and customs authorities into one officer position, but provides very little direction or 
guidance on how to overcome the legacy of very different existing positions in the 
agencies from which Congress created CBP. The contexts of the mission and culture of 
their parent agency uniquely defined the positions of Immigration Inspectors and 
Customs Agents and Inspectors.  
The theory behind combining the separate, legacy border agencies into a singular 
Customs and Border Protection agency was to create an agency-wide law enforcement 
and national security culture establishing a unified primary inspection at all U.S. Ports of 
Entry. However, the results of the merger may not have adequately supported the sum of 
all the previous missions. CBP's mission is, to say the least, complicated and expansive. 
CBP must not only protect the borders from the entry of terrorists or their weapons, but is 
charged at the same time with facilitating the movement of legitimate trade and people. 
The strategy attempts to define a common theme among all the component 
agencies by defining ways in which CBP intends to accomplish its missions. The Plan 
proposes that all components accomplish their facilitation goals by gathering advance 
data regarding incoming and outgoing people, conveyances and goods, which improve 
targeting and use technology to leverage resources (CBP, 2005, p. 2). The Plan also 
proposes to improve on traditional approaches, innovative regulations and technologies. 
Innovative trade-related activities covered such diverse goals as protecting American 
businesses from the theft of their intellectual property rights (copyright laws) and unfair 
trade practices; regulating and facilitating international trade; collecting import duties; 
enforcing trade laws related to admissibility (certain fruits and vegetables are not allowed 
into the U.S. from particular pre-designated countries); and, collecting the appropriate 
revenue and maintaining export controls. New technologies would also enhance CBP’s 
other traditional missions, which included apprehending individuals attempting to enter 
the country illegally; stemming the flow of illegal drugs and other contraband; protecting 
agriculture and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases; and, processing all 
people, vehicles and cargo entering the U.S. (CBP, 2005, p. 3).  
Thus, CBP's mission statement expressed the desire to become an integrated, 
single border agency. It states,  
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We are the guardians of our nation’s borders; We are America’s frontline; 
We safeguard the American homeland at and beyond our borders; We 
protect the American public against terrorists and the instruments of terror; 
We steadfastly enforce the laws of the United States while fostering our 
nation’s economic security through lawful international trade and travel; 
We serve the American public with vigilance, integrity and 
professionalism. (CBP 2005, p. 4) 
The framework for CBP's efforts is organized around four conventional areas: 
Strategic Goal—a high level statement of what needs to be achieved; Objectives—
specific statements of what is to be accomplished within the goal; Strategies—specific 
actions to be taken to reach an objective; and Performance measures—what is to be 
accomplished by executing the strategies (CBP, 2005, p. 13).  
Although the plan focuses on what CBP is supposed to do, the goals to 
accomplish, and the priorities to be pursued; it does not provide a set of guiding 
principles, ethical guidelines, crosscutting values, and shared outcomes commonly 
defined as success throughout the merged agency. In short, it does not provide a strategic 
basis of reasoning and action shared by all components. A doctrine for border governance 
is missing, which leaves the various CBP components with few fundamental principles 
upon which to collaborate and succeed together. 
The intent of this research is to determine the value of doctrine as applied to CBP 
as an organization. The research consists of reviewing existing policy and strategy as 
evaluated from various perspectives within CBP and across the government. The research 
examines how the development of a border doctrine is necessary to support shared 
policies and objectives leading to enhanced operational performance. 
This thesis serves to fill a gap in research regarding border security doctrine, as 
very little is presently published on the subject. Much literature exists on strategy and 
policy in relation to border security; yet, the subject of a doctrine has not been breached. 
The significance of this thesis to future research efforts is that it provides the basics; what 
doctrine is to border security, whether it is useful, and whether CBP is at a point where 
the development of doctrine is feasible. Future research could focus on the actual 
development and implementation of a border security doctrine.  
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It is the desire of the author to provide the Assistant Commissioners and the 
Commissioner of CBP the immediate consumers, a comprehensive explanation of the 
benefits of doctrine for CBP, and create a sense of common identity among the CBP 
components, as well as discuss the conditions under which this doctrine could be 
developed. This study identifies gaps and analyzes existing policies, missions and 
conditions currently inhibiting CBP from achieving universal organizational success.  
The intent of this study is to determine the challenges CBP is facing due to the 
merger, and identify behaviors and systems that can improve the conditions within the 
organization, as well as explain how CBP can develop itself into a learning organization.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following is a review of the available literature related to doctrine, 
collaborative activities and the issues surrounding why organizations cannot or do not 
function well internally, and in addition, how these issues can be improved. This 
literature review also provides information available concerning border security. The 
review is divided into categories describing the available literature regarding definitions 
of doctrine, military doctrine, other literature on doctrine, literature about collaboration, 
learning organizations, trust and existing Border Security Strategy. 
A. DEFINITIONS FOR DOCTRINE 
Multiple definitions for doctrine exist. Doctrine is defined by Webster’s 
dictionary as “a principle or body of principles presented by a specific field, system or 
organization for acceptance or belief.” From the organizational perspective, doctrine is 
those shared beliefs and principles that define the work of a profession. Principles are 
described as basic truths, laws or assumptions; rules or standards of behavior; fixed or 
predetermined policies or modes of actions. Doctrine is also described as the 
codifications of what a profession thinks and does whenever the profession’s membership 
performs in the usual and normal way (Tritten, 2008, p. 1).  
The major U.S. military branches use the definition from the NATO Logistics 
Handbook, which cites doctrine as fundamental principles by which the military forces or 
elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative 
but requires judgment in application (NATO, 2008). According to the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (2008), doctrine is to be used as guidance whenever possible, but those applying the 
mechanism in a real world situation have the leverage to use the strategic means 
necessary to accomplish their task.  
Doctrine has also been defined as what is believed concerning the best way to 
conduct military affairs (Drew & Snow, 1988, p. 163). According to Drew and Snow, 
two important words occur in this definition, believe and best. “Believe” suggests that 
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doctrine is the result of an examination and interpretation of available evidence, and also 
suggests the interpretation can be changed should new evidence surface. “Best” connotes 
a standard; a guide for those who conduct military affairs. Doctrinal beliefs are described 
as interpretations of changing evidence (Drew & Snow, 1988, p. 163). Note that the 
source for this information is over 20 years old. However, the basic ideas presented do 
not appear to have changed significantly.  
B. MILITARY DOCTRINE 
The most common sources for doctrine relate to military doctrine, likely due to 
the military’s widespread publication, use and attention to doctrine. The U.S. Military 
devotes entire institutions to doctrine development, such as the U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC). An agreement in large part exists among sources as to 
the definitions, applications and uses of doctrine to guide actions, as well as some dispute 
as to whether joint or individual service doctrines are better applied to military 
operations; the resulting conclusion being that they both have something to offer to an 
organization. 
Joint doctrine is defined as fundamental principles that guide the employment of 
U.S. military forces in coordinated (working in concert with one another) action toward a 
common (shared among the participants) objective. Joint doctrine contained in joint 
publications also includes terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Joint doctrine does 
not replace or alter a commander’s authority and obligation to determine the proper 
course of action under the circumstances. Joint doctrine focuses on how to think about 
operations, not what to think. The purpose of doctrine is to aid thinking, not replace it 
(Joint Staff, 2008, p. 12).  
According to Lieutenant Colonel William Furr (1991), to some people, doctrine 
consists of broad principles that reflect “the way in which the organization and its 
members think and respond to events.” To others, doctrine tells them specifically how to 
fight. As a result of these different expectations, doctrine is viewed as either too specific 
and limits options or too general and states nothing useful. These attitudes were displayed 
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shortly after the advent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act,1 and since the Joint Staff has 
attempted to come to grips with this issue, however, different perspectives still exist. 
These perspectives occur because the individuals who participate in the process are 
products of their service, and the services are extensively diverse, “none clearly 
predominant, each reflecting to its own degree the fact that the United States is at the 
same time a maritime power, an aerospace power and a continental power” (Furr, 1991). 
In 2005, a report was written about a study conducted by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies on defense reform entitled The Second Goldwater-Nichols Act. The 
project had three phases. Phase one dealt with civilian, joint and service balance, 
budgeting, national security personnel and interagency relations. Phase two dealt with 
force capabilities, regional and functional command issues, defense acquisition, military 
education and other matters. Phase three dealt with military command structures, 
acquisition and Guard and Reserve issues. The report recommends, based on changes in 
the world since the implementation of the original Goldwater-Nichols Act, the creation of 
a Joint Requirements Oversight Council to create a capability for generating conventional 
forces requirements. This report also recommends that the Joint Forces command should 
work more closely with regional commanders to build more capacity in these 
commanders by moving requirements creation out of service-centric processes.  
Within the military, in addition to the use of joint service doctrine, each branch of 
the military has their own doctrine specific to that branch. Since the implementation of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, a growing body of joint doctrine has guided U.S. military 
actions, such as the Joint Intelligence Doctrine for Support to Joint Military Operations 
(DoD, 1986). However, a parallel reduction in individual service doctrine has not 
 
1 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Sen. 
Barry Goldwater and Rep. Bill Nichols, caused a major defense reorganization. Operational authority was 
centralized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as opposed to the service chiefs. The chairman was 
designated as the principal military advisor to the president, National Security Council and Secretary of 
Defense. The act established the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain of 
command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified commanders.  Since 1986, the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act has made tremendous changes in the way the Department of Defense (DoD) 
operates as joint operations are the norm, for example in the Arabian Gulf, Zaire, Haiti, and Bosnia. 
Implementation of the act is an on-going project with Joint Vision 2010 (1996) and Joint Vision 2020 
(2000). Both documents emphasize that to be the most effective force, it is necessary to be fully joint: 
intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically. The joint force, because of its 
flexibility and responsiveness, remains the key to operational success in the future.  
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occurred. J. J. Tritten (2008, p. 4) argues that this reduction has cultivated doctrinal 
conflict and inefficiencies in the doctrine process, which he says affects the entirety of 
the American military organization. On the other hand, it can be argued that value may 
also lie in retaining individual service doctrine, as the individual military services do not 
perform all operations jointly. 
Doctrine is designed to be fluid and change over time depending on the possible 
existing circumstances (Davenport & Prusak, 2000). Military doctrine has changed more 
than once over the years. Davenport and Prusak (2000) claim that this change typically 
occurs after an experience that exposed gaps in the existing doctrine. The military began 
performing After Action Reviews (AAR) in a program aimed at knowledge management. 
The AAR program identifies lessons learned. The exercise involved an examination of 
what was supposed to happen in a mission or action, what actually happened, why a 
difference existed between the two, and what could be learned from the disparities. 
Results from the AAR were quickly incorporated into Army doctrine, or its formally 
documented procedures and training programs (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 1). 
CBP’s component offices perform after action reports/reviews related to a 
multitude of events, from Congressional testimony to Operations Orders, but no defined 
system for collecting, reviewing and implementing lessons learned from those after 
action reviews exists.  
The literature available for military doctrine is for the most part the same from 
one branch to the other. The military branches all appear to have a doctrinal development 
process, as well as an office and individuals whose sole responsibility it is to develop 
such processes. One challenge encountered while performing the literature review was 
gaining access to the doctrinal documents themselves, as well as determining what they 
say in simple terms. To overcome this restriction, it was necessary to find individuals 
possessing this knowledge and access. Several current and former military officers 
assisted in providing this information, which led to a greater understanding of the 
doctrinal documents without the necessity of reviewing each one.  
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C. OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION REGARDING DOCTRINE 
USAWC guide to national security issues, Vol. I: Theory of war and strategy, June 
2008, provides an overview of past and present military strategy. The works within the 
publication focus on the military, diplomacy, economic strategy, space and air and land 
power. Many of the papers offer policy recommendations, while others provide 
overviews without suggestions but strive for a better understanding of past concepts of 
strategy. Of particular interest was a paper discussing the relation of doctrine to theory, 
networks, systems and subsystems. The literature described enemies as systems, and how 
if one attacks the enemy by taking out the leadership, they may succeed in bringing down 
the system—if it is a centralized system. The literature is useful in determining what parts 
of a system or network are essential for function and survival, as well as indicating that 
those with a loose or decentralized organizational structure, such as a cartel or terrorist 
organization, may not be ideal for the type of warfare that attacks only the leadership. In 
essence, organizations cannot survive on leadership alone since they are systems with 
interrelated “rings,” and to win a war, so to speak, forces should take a systems approach, 
attacking the rings of the system that make most sense depending on the variables at that 
time.  
D. EXECUTIVE DOCTRINE 
The federal government has historically issued executive doctrines for 
institutionalizing a change in the ideology behind international military affairs and 
diplomatic efforts. For example, the Monroe Doctrine proclaimed that European powers 
could no longer colonize or interfere with the affairs of the newly independent nations of 
the Americas (Monroe, 1823, p. 1). This doctrine eventually became a longstanding 
principle of U.S. foreign policy. Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, 
drew upon a foundation of American diplomatic ideals, such as separating from European 
affairs and the defense of neutral rights. The Monroe Doctrine, introduced on December 
2, 1823, stated that further efforts by European governments to colonize land or interfere 
with states in the Americas would be viewed by the United States of America as acts of 
aggression requiring U.S. intervention (Tremblay, pp. 133–134). The Monroe Doctrine 
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asserted that the Western Hemisphere was not to be further colonized by European 
countries, and that the U.S. would not interfere with existing European colonies or in the 
internal concerns of European countries. This doctrine was issued at a time when many 
Latin American countries were on the verge of becoming independent from Spain, and 
the U.S., reflecting concerns echoed by Great Britain, hoped to avoid having any 
European power take Spain's colonies (Herring, p. 153).  
In the 1940s, the U.S. began to see a change in international affairs and the need 
for a change in theology, once again. With the Truman Doctrine, President Harry S. 
Truman established that the U.S. would provide political, military and economic 
assistance to all democratic nations threatened by external or internal authoritarian forces. 
The Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented U.S. foreign policy, away from its usual 
stance of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly involving the U.S., to one of 
possible intervention in far away conflicts. Truman argued that the U.S. could no longer 
stand by and allow the forcible expansion of Soviet tyranny into free, independent 
nations, because American national security now depended upon more than just the 
physical security of its territory. Instead, in a sharp break with its traditional avoidance of 
extensive foreign commitments beyond the Western Hemisphere during peacetime, the 
Truman Doctrine actively committed the U.S. to offering assistance to preserve the 
political integrity of democratic nations when such an offer was deemed to be in the best 
interest of the U.S. (Department of State, 2009).  
The Bush Doctrine also exists, which simply stated, is a commitment to pre-
emptive war against terrorists groups, ineffective states that facilitate terrorist groups, and 
rogue states that sponsor terrorist groups (Ollivant, 2004, p. 4). This doctrine was issued 
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The phrase initially 
described the policy that the U.S. had the right to secure itself from countries that harbor 
or provide aid to terrorist groups, which was used to justify the 2001 invasion of 
Afghanistan. It was deemed that the group from which the terrorists were directed, Al 
Qaeda, was being given free reign to operate in Afghanistan and that the government of 
Afghanistan was harboring its leaders. It was a change to the existing doctrine that 
required a conventional military threat for the U.S. to take military action against the 
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government of another nation. Later, the doctrine came to include additional elements, 
including the controversial policy of preventive war, which held that the U.S. should 
depose foreign regimes that represented a potential or perceived threat to the security of 
the United States, even if that threat was not immediate; a policy of spreading democracy 
around the world, especially in the Middle East, as a strategy for combating terrorism; 
and a willingness to pursue U.S. military interests in an independent way (Allen, 2007, p. 
2003; Levin, 2006).  
These executive doctrines resulted from a perceived need for change in the overall 
approach of the U.S. in foreign affairs. A change in the international atmosphere or 
environment had occurred and the response was to address that environment in a manner 
that required the issuance of an overarching fundamental guidance statement of sorts. The 
intent of the doctrinal statements was not to describe how it was to be done, tactically or 
operationally, but instead, to describe the ideal or the theological beliefs.  
E. RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE 
Examples of religious doctrine exist as well. Christian Doctrine, for example, 
began its development as early as A.D. 325 with the First Council of Nicaea, which was a 
council of Christian bishops who convened in Nicaea in Bithynia (present day Iznik in 
Turkey). For the first time, an attempt was made to attain consensus in the church 
through an assembly representing all Christendom (Kieckhefer, 1989). The reason behind 
the meeting of the council was to clarify for Christians the foundational beliefs and 
subsequent acceptable behaviors of the religion and to provide clarity, guidance and 
consensus. According to Erwin Iserloh’s publication, The theses were not posted: Luther 
between Reform and Reformation (1968), in 1517, Martin Luther filed his Ninety-Five 
Theses with the Catholic Church. Luther used these theses to show his displeasure with 
the Roman Catholic clergy’s abuses, primarily concerning indulgences and confessions. 
Taking the lessons learned from Luther’s theses, the Catholic Church responded in 1545 
with the initiation of the Council of Trent, which is considered one of the most important 
councils of the Church (Wetterau, 1994), and resulted in a change in doctrine. This 
example is provided to demonstrate that doctrine is used to define commonality and 
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fundamental beliefs, and is developed and published in an effort to institutionalize these 
fundamentals throughout an organization, as well as showing the process by which 
doctrine can be changed or altered when circumstances exist that require a change.  
F. CBP STRATEGY AND POLICY 
The Strategic Plan for CBP identifies six strategic goals, which are further 
supported by the strategies and strategic goals of the component offices that comprise 
CBP. These offices prevent terrorism at Ports of Entry and between Ports of Entry, unite 
as one border agency, facilitate legitimate trade and travel, protect America and its 
citizens, and modernize and manage the agency (CBP, 2005, p. 13). 
The number three strategic goal is that of “unifying as one border agency;” the 
desire for a unified culture of its own and the aspiration of a common framework from 
which to draw and operate. The challenge for CBP is in identifying shared border 
security principles and collective best practices, as no literature is readily available, 
which describes them specifically.  
G. DOCUMENTATION INTERNAL TO DHS AND CBP 
While searching for other literature regarding doctrine or other unifying efforts 
within CBP, this research uncovered doctrinal efforts within the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and other initiatives relative to integration within CBP 
currently underway. 
The endeavor internal to CBP was an executive leadership driven effort in which 
the component office heads were tasked by former CBP Commissioner Basham to 
research the organization in an effort to discover why it did not run as efficiently as it 
could. One particular part of that research was in the area of Mission Integration. The 
goal of this portion was first, to determine where the gaps were in integrating the 
organization, why those gaps existed, and second, develop answers or processes as to 
how they could be improved. The Mission Integration effort uncovered several different 
areas in which CBP needed improvement or change. One particular area was that of 
conflicting definitions of what border security meant between the component offices. In 
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other words, border security to the Office of Field Operations did not appear to mean the 
same thing as it did to the Office of International Affairs. One of the purposes for 
creating doctrine was to settle on clear and unified definitions, which, in this case, could 
very well be “border security.” Another area, in which this group of individuals 
determined that CBP was experiencing difficulty, was the area of branding. The opinion 
was that CBP was not represented as an organization by a recognizable brand, such as 
Coca Cola or FedEx.  
Branding is discussed further in the body of this thesis. While not doctrinal, so to 
speak, it does resonate with the indoctrination factor for CBP. Once CBP acquires its 
identity, it can educate people about branding, and relay that through a brand, CBP can 
feel it has made an accomplishment toward integration. 
The members of the DHS Operations Coordination and Planning Directorate are 
currently involved in the development of doctrine for that component of DHS. The draft 
document outlines DHS’ philosophy for improved coordination of homeland security 
mission activities across the department and with its partners. As stated by the doctrine 
office, this is the first major step in a series of departmental doctrinal publications. 
Homeland security operations coordination doctrine states support for the Secretary’s 
goal of achieving “One DHS,” emphasizes partnerships at all levels, and strengthens 
operational effectiveness. Application of these doctrinal concepts to operations is 
expected to augment the accomplishment of the Secretary’s priorities, to include 
counterterrorism and domestic security management; securing our borders; smart and 
tough enforcement of immigration laws; preparing for, responding to, and recovering 
from disasters; and maturing and unifying DHS.  
H. COLLABORATION, TRUST AND LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS 
Much of the literature regarding collaboration, learning organizations and trust 
centered on the common themes of leadership and systems thinking. As well, many 
articles, books and other reference material pointed to a common source expert for much 
of the information, Peter Senge. Both learning organization and collaboration literature 
cited Senge. All three of the concepts were interdependent on the others for success.  
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According to Peter Senge (1996, p. 1), two views on leadership exist, “no 
significant change will occur unless it is driven from the top,” or conversely, “little 
significant change can occur if it is driven from the top.” A GAO report (2003, p. 2) 
entitled, Results-oriented cultures: Implementation steps to assist mergers and 
organizational transformations, asserts the former view—that transformation must be 
driven by top leadership, and that it must set the direction, pace and tone, which unites 
everyone behind a single mission. Collaborative concepts are moving toward the network 
or systems approach. Boundaries are less visible in today’s environment. Collaboration 
and cooperation are two of today’s biggest buzzwords with command and control taking 
a back seat, often seen as negative and too structured. According to Jeff Luke, (1998, p. 
33), public leadership “is a type of leadership that evokes collaboration and concerted 
action among diverse and often competing groups toward a shared outcome.”  
The majority of available literature related to doctrine and border security is in 
military doctrine. All branches of the military have developed their own doctrine, which 
is used consistently to guide their operations (FAS Military Analysis Network, 2009). 
The available research regarding Border Security Strategy suggests that more work needs 
to be done. Further development of a border security doctrine requires the examination of 
the combination of a component office’s missions, strategies, historical experiences and 
consensus. The largest weaknesses found in the literature were the absence of border 
security doctrine references and recent (less than 20 years ago) sources for doctrinal 
research not related to developing military doctrine. However, publications with 
information related to collaboration and successful organizational models, which are both 
necessary for doctrine to be developed and for it to work in application, exist. Since 
doctrine development includes a combination of collectively determining best practices, 
principles and a common conceptual framework, collaboration and trust are essential. 
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III. A DISPARATE LEGACY, A FRAGMENTED FUTURE 
The majority of CBP’s components existed in agencies and departments originally 
established hundreds of years before the current merger. The U.S. Customs Service, for 
instance, was created in July 31, 1789, upon the signing of the Tariff Act. The 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was born decades ago after bouncing 
around various federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce and the 
Department of Labor before coming to reside in the Department of Justice. Upon the 
merger in 2003, CBP leaders strived to attain a unified “one face at the border” outward 
appearance and atmosphere. The theme, “one face at the border,” attempted to give the 
general public the appearance that CBP was joining all of its immigration and customs 
forces together to unite and better protect America’s borders. From that point forward, 
the leadership and creators hoped to be regarded both inside and outside as one unified 
agency. However, there was some resistance, which was not entirely unexpected. 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the creation of 
DHS constituted the biggest government reorganization in American history and the most 
substantial reorganization of federal agencies since the National Security Act of 1947. 
The latter Act placed the different military departments under a Secretary of Defense and 
created the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency. DHS easily 
surpassed that scale of reorganization. It incorporated 22 federal agencies into a single 
organization, merging their diverse functions and responsibilities (Perl, 2004, p. 176). 
On March 1, 2003, DHS absorbed the INS and, in doing so, divided it into 
separate enforcement and services functions and agencies, such as the Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS). INS' 
border enforcement and facilitation functions were also consolidated into DHS, merging 
functionally with the U.S. Customs Service, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (formerly in the Department of Agriculture) into the new CBP. 
These immense reorganizations occurred with little preparation, re-education and 
re-training, or even communication. Components were thrust together, with now partial 
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functions and missions, into agencies for which no shared histories existed, with little 
experience working together and no cultural direction that defined new principles or 
values. New employees continued to be trained in separate academies and assimilated 
into offices that worked as if the merger had not occurred. In the academies, new 
employees spent upward of 15 weeks in activities specifically designed to train them as 
employees of the pre-merger, legacy component offices. The employees ate, slept, and 
attended classes as a group. Office of Field Operations employees were in the CBP 
Officer Academy that others have documented retained strong orientations toward either 
an INS or a customs legacy. Border Patrol agents continued to attend the Border Patrol 
Academy. 
These academies are located separately on opposite sides of the country. Cross 
training opportunities do not exist at the beginning of a career. It is difficult to learn one 
job, its authorities and the laws, which govern and agent or officer’s daily activities and 
then attempt to teach the new officers and agents that the specific job they perform is 
only one part of a larger organization with a larger mission. CBP Officers and Border 
Patrol Agents are not socialized in one another’s jobs until they meet, if they meet, once 
they are deployed to their ports and stations in the field. Even then, it is from a distance 
with little to no first-hand experience of what the other does on a daily basis or how their 
jobs intertwine. 
The legacy Animal and Plant Health Inspectors’ (part of the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service [APHIS]) job was also rolled into the CBP Officer position. 
These inspectors, however, do not perform a law enforcement function and are not 
armed, even though they wear the same uniform and badge as any other CBP Officer. 
These inspectors are scientists with advanced degrees in biological sciences (including 
botany, entomology and plant pathology), agriculture, natural resource management and 
chemistry. They are primarily responsible for the inspection of animals and plants 
imported into the U.S. Their focus is often on keeping pests and dangerous bacteria out of 
the country.  
In addition to the other difficulties faced with a merger of this size, the CBP 
Officer position combined both immigration and customs authorities into one position 
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from two separate specialties. Shortly after the merger, legacy immigration and customs 
inspectors underwent a training program to learn the responsibilities and laws of 
whichever function they had not performed. In other words, immigration inspectors had 
to learn customs laws and how to enforce them. Customs inspectors were required to 
learn immigration laws and how they were to be enforced. One could assume that few 
legacy employees would be pleased to be drawn from the jobs they had chosen to pursue 
and forced into a position in which they had no choice.  
Many of the component offices’ employees still refer to themselves as their 
legacy agency or they identify themselves as an employee of CBP with the caveat that 
they are from legacy immigration or legacy customs. As well, employees who do not 
perform the law enforcement functions within CBP (civilian employees, e.g., 
administrative assistants, program analysts) do not attend an academy at all and they 
rarely receive an orientation regarding CBP as an agency.  
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found in a study conducted in July 
of 2003 that the key to a successful merger is the people (GAO, 2003). Typically, 
unsuccessful mergers fail because they do not adequately address the wide variety of 
people and cultural issues. Throwing together the different cultures and expecting them to 
simultaneously identify with the organization that is CBP and work together seamlessly 
was an unrealistic expectation. Ironically, GAO's study was conducted and published 
around the same time as the merger of CBP was being planned. It is unknown if the 
architects of CBP had this information before them or whether they were experienced in 
merger processes. It is likely that the environment and expectations within the US. at that 
time inhibited the proper considerations throughout the merger process. Americans 
wanted results, they wanted something done that gave the impression their government 
was fixing what was seemingly broke and had allowed the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to 
happen. The creation of both DHS and CBP were arguably politically motivated.  
Currently, a very fragmented approach exists to address the following areas as a 
whole organization. The areas of interest are border threat, tactical and operational 
intelligence sharing, prosecutions (thresholds are different for OFO and OBP cases), 
resource allocation (what is the priority for allocation and how is that determined), 
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analysis of seizures (only OFO does this), documenting operations (OBP has a system 
called Border Patrol Enforcement Tracking System (BPETS), while no other component 
office within CBP uses such a system) and human resources. This prevents the alignment 
of the components for integrated operations. 
For example, a comprehensive approach to border security threat assessments 
does not exist. Each component office may conduct its own assessment, but these are 
typically not integrated with the larger intelligence picture and few avenues are available 
for sharing intelligence information in a timely manner with other stakeholders.  
Not only are the approaches disjointed, in addition, the areas of responsibility for 
each component office of CBP are not aligned with one another, making it very difficult 
for full integration to be accomplished. The OFO District Offices, which include several 
ports of entry in specified geographic areas, do not align with Border Patrol Sectors, 
which concurrently include a number of Border Patrol Stations. The overlap of these 
offices makes it difficult for resource allocation, collaboration, organization of joint 
tactical operations and regional cooperation. 
This structure, as it stands, allows for cooperation, but not necessarily integration. 
Figure 2 depicts the disparate areas of responsibility; the blue lines define the OFO Field 
Office boundaries and the black lines define the Office of Border Patrol’s sector 
boundaries. For example, it would be very difficult to establish regional offices or 
regional integration (components ability to work seamlessly), as the areas of 
responsibility for the existing components do not match. The logistics alone would 
require double the personnel to accomplish integrated operations, as incidents are not 
likely to occur within a neat and comfortable boundary that CBP designates as its AORs. 
For instance, hurricane Katrina was one instance where several different sectors and 
district offices were affected. The hurricane affected no less than five OBP Sectors and 
three OFO Field Offices, each of which did not have one common location to which to 
report . As a result of this confusion, a Field Coordinating Officer position was 
established to coordinate all of the information arriving from different areas. This 
position serves the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) region. The U.S. 
is divided into 10 regions, which covers multiple CBP Sectors and Field Offices. For this 
particular incident, the FCO served FEMA region six (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 2.   OBP Sectors vs. OFO District Offices 
 
Figure 3.   FEMA Regional Map 
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As another example of non-congruent activities within CBP, the Office of Border 
Patrol utilizes an operational requirements-based budget planning process, as well as 
corresponding metrics to assess its accomplishments by fiscal year. The budget is 
designed based on operational requirements as determined by the field commanders for 
each sector. The requirements can be anything from tactical infrastructure, such as roads 
or fencing to technology, such as cameras or ground sensors to personnel. The 
requirements are determined based on the level of operational control the requestor 
intends to achieve with those resources. The operational control is the metric used to 
measure the effectiveness of the use of the funding and resources provided. However, 
CBP’s Office of Field Operations budgetary planning does not include metrics as 
associated with its requirements, and the majority of the other component offices of CBP 
follow different budgeting formulation structures. OFO focuses on customer service and 
wait times as primary measurements of effectiveness. It is difficult to compare wait times 
and control of the border. Prioritization becomes an issue. This lack of a compatible 
structure relates to doctrine. To develop doctrine, an organization must have synergistic 
and congruent policies before a doctrine can be established.  
The operational requirements-based budgeting process is considered a best 
practice in the Office of Border Patrol, as the leaders believe that the inclusion of metrics 
assists in the justification of their budgetary requests. Simply stated, the Chief of the 
Border Patrol says to Congress, “if you give us “X” amount of dollars, we will give you a 
specified level of control within a designated area of the border.” To convince Congress 
that an organization is deserving of a particular amount of funding, the organization must 
prove its worth to Congress and the taxpayers. Congress is supposed to represent the 
American people, and as such, is essentially spending America’s money. It is vital, 
therefore, for a department or an agency to validate their requests. If they do not provide 
adequate evidence that taxpayer money is being spent and actually achieving results, 
Congress can and has denied budgetary requests. 
Yet, within CBP, no guidance is currently available on this issue, on doctrine, 
policy or otherwise. The Office of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) guidelines are 
the only guidelines available to the component offices with regard to developing 
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budgetary requests. However, those requirements are open to interpretation and no 
established format exists for CBP as an organization. If a component office has not 
submitted a clear and concise product, it is more difficult for the larger organization to 
filter through the information and justify the requirements without that justification being 
provided already. Standardization creates efficiency. Without a standardized mechanism 
to validate budgetary requests, the larger organization is less efficient in explaining its 
overall requirements.  
To begin the process of developing a common conceptual framework or an 
overall organizational doctrine, CBP first must align its internal networks; they must be 
able to talk to one another, learn from one another, to develop trust and collaborate. 
Doctrine is said to provide guidance and standardization to optimize and integrate an 
organization, which encompasses the ideology of what an organization is and how it 
behaves.  
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IV. DOCTRINE, POLICY AND STRATEGY 
Doctrine is defined by Webster’s dictionary as “a principle or body of principles 
presented by a specific field, system or organization for acceptance or belief” 
(Webster.com, 2009). The major U.S. military branches concur with the definition from 
the NATO logistics handbook, which cites doctrine as “fundamental principles by which 
the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national 
objectives” (NATO, 2008). Doctrine is a concept that has been used in reference to 
religious organizations, the military and large corporations. It encompasses the 
fundamental principles that guide an organization and shape its efforts. Doctrine is said to 
help establish standard roles and procedures among stakeholders, both within and outside 
an organization, to enhance information flow and coordination, and to facilitate decision 
making at all levels.  
Doctrine shapes how an organization operates to execute a strategy, describes 
where it comes from, what an organization’s beliefs are and what it has determined is the 
best way to do business. Doctrine serves to articulate what is important to an organization 
or enterprise.  
A. COMPONENTS OF DOCTRINE  
Generally, doctrine is built upon guiding principles and operating concepts. 
Guiding principles provide a framework for how multiple organizations achieve unified, 
collective action, and are the basis of reasoning and action for an organization to 
coordinate operations. Operating concepts are the means by which the guiding principles 
are applied, and describe the how, when, and degree of integration that can enhance 
coordination. Some examples of guiding principles from the draft Homeland Security 
Operations Coordination Doctrine are Unity of Effort and Clear Roles and 
Responsibilities (DHS, 2009, p. 9). Unity of Effort within a particular organization, 
according to DHS, is achieved through the chain of command, policy and statutory 
authorities and established procedures. The aim of Unity of Effort is to achieve collective 
outcomes. Even though stakeholders may have different individual missions, unifying 
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effort when working together toward a shared objective results in greater protection for 
all. Clear Roles and Responsibilities must be understood and respected by components of 
an organization, especially when activities involve more than one entity. It is important to 
prevent duplication of effort, and as such, avoid wasting resources. Coordinating 
operational activities requires each stakeholder to understand its own and its partners’ 
roles and responsibilities clearly.  
Doctrine is designed to be taught, understood and executed. To be effective, it 
must be absorbed and applied. Lessons learned are used to update doctrine, which is a 
feedback mechanism that helps the organization reinforce what does and does not work. 
Doctrine facilitates the organizing of forces tailored for a specific operation.  
The process for the development of doctrine has historically been time consuming 
and laced with bureaucracy. It is necessary for leaders to have vision and develop trust. 
They must be constantly surveying the horizon with a visionary approach to what is next. 
In this manner, doctrinal development will be ahead of a change in the operating 
environment; thus, making operations more proactive and efficient rather than reactive, 
which helps to negate the possibility of missing something.  
B. DOCTRINE VS. POLICY 
Policy and doctrine are closely related, but fundamentally, they fill separate 
requirements. Policy is directive, can assign tasks and can create new roles and 
requirements for new capabilities. Policies are regulations that describe the rules of 
application of particular resources; for instance, firearms policy or pursuit policy for law 
enforcement purposes. The policy lays out the rules or procedures of who can deploy the 
resource, under what circumstances and the steps to take after its deployment, such as 
reporting requirements. A doctrinal principle related to a policy of this particular 
specificity would be very vague unless it was within tactical doctrine. Different levels of 
doctrine exist, which range from overarching organizational to tactical. The military 
refers to tactical doctrine as Field Manuals, which is very specific in nature. Doctrine 
enhances operational effectiveness by providing authoritative guidance and standardized 
terminology on topics of relevance (Joint Staff, 2008, p. 13).  
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Doctrine is reflective of policy, but the policies must be integrated. Rules of 
engagement, for example, would be directed by policy; however, doctrine is something 
larger, broader. Doctrine does not typically establish policy, but rather policy guides 
doctrine development. In the Joint Doctrine Development System (Joint Staff, 2008), the 
purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness of U.S. forces. It 
states specifically that Joint Doctrine will not establish policy. In other words, an 
organization cannot change the rules to fit who they are fundamentally or how they 
behave to achieve their mission—an organization is required to follow policy unless an 
express need exists for it to change, which can take an immense amount of time and 
effort.  
C. DOCTRINE VS. STRATEGY 
Doctrine and strategy also serve different purposes, but they are linked. Strategy 
states the overall goals and objectives. When a tactic or technique is part of a strategy—
doctrine helps it establish its identity and what it does as it institutionalizes and codifies 
the strategies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (2008) state, “Joint doctrine establishes a link 
between the ends (what must be accomplished) and the means (capabilities) by providing 
the ways (how) for joint forces to accomplish military strategic and operational objectives 
in support of national strategic objectives.” Joint doctrine is also said to supply 
information to senior civilian leaders responsible for the development of national security 
strategy as to the core competencies, capabilities and limitations of military forces. It also 
provides other government agencies and nongovernmental organizations an opportunity 
to understand the roles, capabilities and operating procedures used by the U.S. military 
better, which is said to facilitate coordination (Joint Staff, 2008, p. 14).  
Conceptually speaking, doctrine and strategy are linked in that doctrine provides 
the framework by which a strategy is accomplished. The strategy employs the means by 
which the organization intends to accomplish its mission. Doctrine is occasionally 
referred to as strategic doctrine, which is likely due to the connection between the two 
concepts. Strategy is defined by dictionary.com (2009) as the science or art of combining 
and employing the means of war in planning and directing large military movements and 
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operations; or a plan, method, or series of maneuvers or stratagems for obtaining a 
specific goal or result. It is further described as the utilization, during both peace and war, 
of all of a nation's forces, through large-scale, long-range planning and development, to 
ensure security or victory. Strategies are typically developed using doctrinal concepts as 
guidance. However, a strategy can also initiate a change in doctrine or the development 
of a new doctrine. For example, when General Petraeus and his troops encountered the 
insurgency warfare in Iraq, they quickly realized that the existing doctrine for 
conventional warfare (“shock and awe,” technology, such as the “Revolution in Military 
Affairs” [RMA]), and the subsequent strategy, or means of applying military force, was 
inadequate to accomplish the goal of getting Iraqi cities under control. The doctrinal 
principle is that the U.S. military conducts ‘Revolutionary Military Affairs’ and the 
strategy is that it uses technology, such as aircraft and heavy artillery to accomplish its 
goal. The military was clinging to a flawed operational model that misidentified the 
center of gravity in a counterinsurgency environment. To change the doctrine and address 
the insurgency, first, the military commanders in the field on the front lines changed their 
strategy, and later, that bottom up initiative led to the Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
(COIN) development (Rotmann, Tohn, & Wharton, 2009, p. 13). Since General Petraeus 
had also participated in the operational environment, and brought his junior leaders to the 
doctrine development table with him, he was able to understand first hand the changes 
that needed to be made.  
D. DOCTRINE, POLICY AND STRATEGY—WHAT IS THE 
CONNECTION? 
In theory doctrine, policy and strategy are hierarchical. Doctrine is the ideology 
that idyllically guides the development of policies that then regulate the application of 
laws in executing strategies. However, in practice, the process is cyclical and an 
organization is required to know its rules or policies to develop what it is and what it 
believes. In addition, changes in one arguably affect the other.  
A change in policy or strategy can drive a change in doctrine. Thus, any change in 
doctrine that may be proactive and through visionary thinking can drive a change in 
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strategy, and maybe policy, if that is deemed necessary. Doctrine is a way to 
institutionalize foundational beliefs, which are then applied to strategy and tactics. When 
the doctrine is applied to what an organization does, the doctrine itself may be driven by 
a change in the strategy. Doctrine is a foundation for strategy and policy but also a 
function of what the overall strategy would be. When a strategy is not completely 
successful based on the doctrine or guidance it is following, this may lead to a change in 
the doctrine to make it possible to accomplish the strategic end. 
E. APPLICATION OF DOCTRINAL CONCEPTS TO CBP 
In the case of CBP, strategy exists as do guiding principles and operating 
concepts, but they just have not been institutionalized or codified. When a tactic or 
technique is part of a strategy, doctrine helps the agency establish its identity as it 
institutionalizes and codifies the strategies. For example, within CBP, the Office of Air 
and Marine is relegated as a support component; this would be a doctrinal concept as it 
defines their role within the agency. The strategic plans are then developed with this 
concept in mind and in line with organizational policies or rules, and then the goals and 
objectives of the strategy are accomplished by using that framework as a guide.  
According to a Professor of Behavioral Science at the Industrial College of the 
Armed Forces National Defense University, “without doctrine, you train and operate on 
an anecdotal basis. When changing how an organization does business, as it applies to 
strategic and operational activities, the change needs to be institutionalized and codified 
so that it survives and is then implemented and taught throughout the organization..” This 
process plays an important role in succession planning, which is arguably one area in 
which CBP has not managed success. Currently, if a new Commissioner were to take 
control of CBP, he or she could very easily decide to “change the way CBP does 
business” based on a political whim. With doctrine, it is more difficult to make sweeping 
changes unless a definite need arises for change based on evidence gathered during the 
strategic application of the doctrinal principles.  
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In the case of border security, visionary thinking is absolutely imperative as CBP 
is the frontline against mechanisms of terror entering the U.S. This is not meant as strictly 
applicable to tactical operations, however. Consideration of policy, budgetary and other 
administrative operations are also subject to the same cyclical processes and should not 
be excluded from an overarching doctrine, which are support components within the 
organization and the operational components cannot function appropriately without them.  
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V. KEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the key points and consensual issues 
uncovered through the research. It identifies six key themes, drawn primarily from an 
analysis of interviews, discussions, and analysis of internal function within the 
organization. The interview questions focused both on what the respondents’ 
understandings were of doctrine as well as their views as to what a Border Security 
Doctrine may include, at least in theory.  
A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
See the Appendix for the interview questions posed for this thesis. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Utilizing qualitative methods, the researcher is able to characterize, interpret, or 
appraise the event being studied and offer the advantage of providing a descriptive 
narrative of the inquiry process in a natural setting. For this study, guided interviews, 
document analysis, and literature review are used to address the questions posed. Data, 
when reviewed, may suggest an area for clarification during interviews. 
The data collected were derived from interviews, personal experiences and 
written documentation, including published literature and internal documents to DHS and 
CBP. The document analysis, when available, is used to validate the responses elicited 
during the interviews. 
The sampling was purposeful as the research focused primarily on interviews of 
individuals within U.S. Customs and Border Protection with specific knowledge and 
experience in policy and strategy creation and implementation. Threats to reliability 
posed by subject bias are handled by careful description of those who provided the data. 
This description includes information relevant to the subjects, and the decision process 
utilized in their selection. Agreement to participate was voluntary. Known leaders 
throughout the organization were chosen for the interviews since they are considered 
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visionary thinkers with a great deal of concern for the well-being of the organization that 
is CBP. The individual interview participants are not identified to maintain anonymity of 
the subjects. The condition of anonymity creates an environment in which a free and 
honest exchange of ideas can occur. 
Verbatim accounts of the information elicited, as well as descriptive narratives are 
used. Although interpretive comments may be added, the primary data remains as 
accurate as possible. This study employed the use of audio recordings of the interviews, 
which assists in increasing reliability.  
Validity is concerned with the accuracy of research findings. The researcher uses 
interviews, qualitative data collection and analysis, as well as a review of available 
literature relative to the topics under study. This process addresses the limitations of a 
single data source or single researcher’s bias. Although these criteria may not address all 
the threats to reliability and validity, they are appropriate methods to ensure that the study 
data are credible, verifiable, consistent, and meaningful. 
Interview data allows the researcher to assess the perspective-sampled population 
and to elicit information about those factors, which cannot be observed. For this study, a 
guided interview approach is used. The author identified topics and issues to be covered 
in advance, and also decided the sequence of the questions during the course of the 
interviews. Questions regarding present experiences and activities provided descriptive 
data that led to eliciting greater detail and establishing a context for opinions, feelings, 
and interpretations. The questions reflect a non-judgmental and neutral rapport. The 
researcher was interested in the respondent’s experience; not to convey approval or 
disapproval of said experience. In other words, no judgment or implication in the 
questioning suggested the interviewees were right or wrong, but instead, the questions 
were formatted to draw information from these experiences.  
Anonymity and confidentiality are ethical concerns for all researchers. No 
identifying data is reported in this study. Participants are informed of the purpose of the 
study and that a possibility exists of identification from the descriptions or quotations  
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used in the study. As a result, the issue of confidentiality and anonymity is negotiated 
with the participants prior to the interviews. Respondents may choose to terminate their 
participation at any time.  
Six persons were interviewed; four executive level leaders (Assistant 
Commissioner or equivalent for a component office) from within CBP, a mid-level 
manager within CBP, and a Professor of Behavioral Science at the Industrial College of 
the Armed Forces, National Defense University.  
One reason for interviewing a former member of the military was that CBP is 
considered a para-military organization by many. CBP is organized in a manner that 
resembles a military organization. For instance, the operational component offices within 
CBP could be likened to the branches of DoD). The OBP and the OFO could be likened 
to the Army or Marines, as they are the ground troops. The Office of Air and Marine 
(OAM) is an organization much like the Air Force and the Navy concerning their 
operational perspectives. The component offices also follow a chain of command model 
and their operations could be described as a hybrid of both military and law enforcement 
activities. CBP’s missions and operations are comparable to military missions. It has a 
defense posture along the borders of the U.S. and is tasked with protecting the Homeland 
from terrorists. The National Guard, a military organization, also performs law 
enforcement functions under the auspices of drug intervention. Law enforcement and 
military operations often cross paths, especially in the federal arena. CBP’s role is larger 
than enforcing the criminal laws of the U.S.; it is homeland security, both nationally and 
internationally. 
Another reason for interviewing a former military officer and War College 
professor was that the use of doctrine is widespread throughout DoD, which possesses 
Joint Doctrine that then cascades down into individual doctrines for each branch of the 
military with respect to their distinct expertise. The idea was to gain the military 
perspective as they seem to have the most obvious and current experience with the 
concept.  
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The research included interviews with executive level leaders within CBP. These 
leaders include the Office of Field Operations, Office of Border Patrol, CBP Office of Air 
and Marine, the Office of International Affairs (INA) and an interview with a mid-level 
manager within OBP, as well as a discussion with the director for development of 
doctrine for the DHS Operations Coordination and Planning Directorate. The director’s 
contribution provided the research objective insight as to the overall departmental 
responsibility for operations and planning to include department level border security 
planning. 
The U.S. Border Patrol provided insight as to the specific principles that address 
the physical border and its protection between the Ports of Entry. An Assistant Chief 
from the Office of Border Patrol provided a leadership perspective more closely aligned 
with operational or tactical focus. The representative from the OFO provided the 
perspective from the Ports of Entry with regard to trade, commerce, and legal or illegal 
entry of persons and contraband. CBP OAM is an integral part of the border security 
posture as its provides support to the other components of CBP through the coordinated 
use of integrated air and marine forces. The INA strives to extend U.S. borders by 
implementing programs and initiatives that promote anti-terrorism, global border 
security, non-proliferation, export controls and immigration and capacity building.  
The data generated through qualitative research can be enormous. A systematic 
method of analysis can facilitate the task of assessing meaning. The first step in content 
analysis is to review all data for completeness and quality, and to identify any potentially 
incomplete areas. Any missing data is collected prior to continuing the data analysis. Any 
themes are identified and the data is then organized around these themes. Any 
information of interest that emerges during data collection is defined and examined. This 
process helps address any contradicting explanations. 
Data were collected through personal interaction and observation by the 
researcher concerning the manner in which U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
functions today using no more than policy and strategy, with little formal guidance 
beyond the legacy documentation. In the researcher’s daily activities within the 
department, the opportunity existed to attend meetings and planning sessions that 
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required participation of individuals from separate functions of DHS and CBP. The 
collaborative activities of these work groups were observed, as well as any issues that 
arose regarding standing policy and strategy, and the analysis of that information 
determined if an overarching agreed upon facet of principles would be useful in 
facilitating those efforts. These observations assisted in advancing the goals of this 
research by providing current situational information and real life examples of when and 
how a guiding doctrine could be realistically developed and implemented. 
A descriptive narrative summarizes the data in reference to the research questions 
posed in this study, which includes explanatory statements concerning identified 
relationships, similarities, and differences. An attempt is made to specify how the data 
relate to broader areas of interest. The data is also analyzed within the political context of 
the Border Security environment. 
C. DOCTRINE WITHIN A LEARNING ORGANIZATION 
The professor from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense 
University was the first interviewee, who defined doctrine very simply as the basis or the 
foundation. He went on to explain it as both the theoretical and practical basis for 
determining what to do and how to do it. He confirmed the literature had expressed 
doctrine as a codification of principles, procedures, tactics and techniques that provide 
the basis for training and ongoing operations. From his perspective, which is the military 
perspective, doctrine is the foundation, but it is also responsive and cyclical. Doctrine is 
certainly not static and for it to be effective, soldiers and members of units must learn and 
rehearse doctrinal principles on a continual basis. 
During the interview, the respondent described a concept recently introduced by 
General Petraeus called the Engine of change. General Petraeus led the effort of the most 
recent change in Army Doctrine. His publications have included material related to the 
counterinsurgency effort in Iraq. Figure 4 is a pictorial description of the process of 
developing and changing doctrine, and how it relates to an agency as a learning 





Figure 4.   The Engine of Change (From: Petraeus, 2009). 
An explanation of the pictorial follows; however, some parallel observations 
should be explained. In attempting to understand the concept of doctrine, it can be related 
to the concept of theory. In fact, theory is described as a belief or principle that guides 
action or assists comprehension or judgment; a particular concept or view of something 
to be done or of the method of doing it; and a system of rules or principles 
(dictionary.com, 2009). According to Clayton K. S. Chun, (2008, p. 295), theory can 
provide a framework to consider how to approach a problem. It can assists in considering 
issues or questions that need to be solved before making detailed approaches toward 
developing a strategy, which is very similar to the concept of doctrine.  
The engine of a change model represents a systems model and an evolutionary 
process. Therefore, changes in doctrine drive changes in leader development, which drive 
changes in collective training, which drive changes in operations, which drive lessons 
learned as the doctrine is applied, which then drives more changes in doctrine, and the 
iterative cycle continues. These four components of the learning organization are 
represented as cogs within this diagram. The process of driving change in an organization 
is dependent upon all the cogs being in alignment, and if a cog is out of alignment, the 
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change process breaks down until it is brought back into alignment. For example, if 
leader development does not change in response to changes in doctrine, then the rest of 
the cogs do not turn, and the organization does not then make changes in collective 
training, conduct of operations, etc. Thus, the change process breaks down. The Engine of 
Change is also about how and why doctrine is changed, which in the model, is shown as 
a change necessitated by lessons learned (feedback). In the absence of feedback, it can be 
argued that little incentive exists to change doctrine, and according to the professor, 
doctrine most often does not change unless there is a perceived need for change. 
D. DOCTRINAL THEMES 
The following information identifies the major themes recognized throughout the 
interviews. The majority of the data for this portion of the study were drawn from the 
interviews of senior and mid-level officials within CBP. The represented component 
offices of CBP are the Office of International Affairs, Office of Field Operations, the 
Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination, the Office of Air and Marine and the 
Office of Border Patrol. The remaining source for the data lies within the author’s daily 
observations and analysis of the organizations’ inner workings, policies and strategies.  
1. Theme #1: Major Organizational Challenges for U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection 
When asked to identify major organizational challenges for CBP, one of the 
respondents identified branding; what is portrayed to the general public and its own 
employees is “not done well.” He went on to explain that the employees are CBP even 
though they have separate functions. The interesting thing about this concept is that 
depending on the perspective, there is either ‘One CBP’ or a CBP as a joint organization, 
much like the joint military operations and functions. CBP can be seen as an organization 
comprised of separate, yet cooperative functions that serve the larger organization jointly.  
Current efforts exist to define CBP as ‘One CBP;’ to have only one symbol or 
brand that expresses it, one name, one academy, one identity resulting in something 
likened to a submersive indoctrination (to teach somebody a belief, doctrine, or ideology 
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thoroughly and systematically). To quote one interviewee: “Indoctrination has to be done 
better.” He was referring to that at the current time; CBP has separate academies for the 
training of its component offices. The Office of Border Patrol has one academy, OFO has 
another and OAM has yet another, none of which is coincidentally located in the same 
place. Even today, legacy attitudes are expressed throughout the academy experience to 
many employees. This is not specific to CBP. In his thesis, Immigration and customs 
enforcement: dysfunctional not by design, Phillip Wrona (2007, p. 65) describes this 
anomaly within ICE. He cites an interview in which a research participant describes the 
academy experience; “…training at FLETC in 2004 and 2005 was the same. In training, 
we had to sit around and listen to disgruntled legacy Customs Agents bad mouth INS and 
everything that happened…” The CBP offices of OFO and OAM may have similar 
academy experiences. OBP did not undergo as much of fundamental reorganization 
during the merger; they were left largely intact and the day-to-day operations for Border 
Patrol Agents have not changed significantly. However, OFO experienced the same 
reorganization as ICE. They combined Customs (Title 19) and Immigration (Title 8) 
authorities into one position—the CBP Officer. It should be noted that an additional 
position was amalgamated into the title of CBP Officer, even though it is not a law 
enforcement position, that of the agricultural inspector position. The uniform and same 
badge are the same; however, they are scientists, not law enforcement officers and do not 
carry a weapon.  
Although this thesis does not delve into the current academy atmosphere, the fact 
remains that while individuals are hired by CBP as an organization, by the end of their 
academy training, they have had only about a week of exposure to the organization 
known as CBP. The rest is component office specific with a large element of 
indoctrination and team building in identifying with that specific office, which is seen as 
a significant gap in the opportunity for the organization to develop a mindset of 
allegiance and identity to CBP.  
Another organizational challenge identified was the general misunderstanding or 
even knowledge of the overall mission of CBP. As one participant stated, “As long as 
your goals, missions and objectives are known, your organization is solid, if people don’t 
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know them, they should.” This, in turn, enables the organization to bring to bear the best 
of its capabilities in response to an event synergistically. According to this same 
interviewee, at the field level, few people know the broader vision, mission, which is 
attributed to a breakdown at the local leadership level. This breakdown was a second area 
identified as one in which CBP has an opportunity to educate its employees. If CBP does 
not bind is efforts, people or thinking, they can lose sight of the real priority.  
In continuing the identification of organizational challenges, one of the 
participants stated, “in order for synergy to occur strategies need to align.” In yet another 
instance relative to this thought process, the participant stated, “you have jurisdictions 
and multiple agencies with differing entitlements and authorities.” In a separate interview 
of an individual at a mid-level manager position, “each component has its own culture, 
identity and institutional memory and those tend to separate rather than align.” Evidently, 
even at the middle manager level, there is the acknowledgment that CBP is not unified. 
Repeatedly, the terms align and synergize are used to describe what should be rather than 
what is. The need for visionary thinking and planning of how “it” should work was also a 
common theme among respondents.  
A significant topic broached was that of infrastructure. The common theme is that 
infrastructure as a whole for the entire organization before the merger and today is still 
largely outdated and antiquated. The fact of the matter is that before the advent of the 
Secure Border Initiative, little attention was paid to the lack of technology and 
infrastructure that supported the legacy agencies, which now comprise CBP. One 
participant put it very well by saying, “we’re doing a 21st century job in a 19th century 
environment.” The volume of traffic, both legal and illegal, that CBP handles on a daily 
basis cannot be supported by equipment and infrastructure originally implemented in the 
1940s or even the 1990s. With the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), cross border traffic increased exponentially. The Ports of Entry simply cannot 
sufficiently support today’s volume of traffic. Progress is being made, but only for one 
component office at a time, and at an alarmingly slow pace.  
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2. Theme #2: What is CBP’s Common Conceptual Framework? 
When asked, “does CBP have a common conceptual framework?” the participants 
had difficulty in answering. The question was intended to draw out what the leaders in 
CBP thought its conceptual framework was. Instead, the respondents focused on what 
CBP did not have rather than what could emerge as common ground. The clear 
commonality was the absence of commonality. Some of the answers were: “Keep bad 
things and bad people out of the country,” “We have it in terms of an overarching 
strategical document, but we have yet to reach the unified approach outcome,” “We are 
still dealing with legacy cultures/doctrine,” “We need to put together the best practices,” 
“Capabilities have not merged,” “We have incongruent Areas of Responsibility (AOR) 
boundaries,” “CBP is far from optimal with regard to our lay down.” These comments 
suggest that collaboration among the component offices is severely lacking, especially in 
the policy and administrative functions. It also highlights that not much has changed in 
the six years since CBP was created. People are still complaining about the past, 
describing what should have been done, rather than taking the initiative to make those 
things happen. Their daily activities are fraught with extinguishing internal fires rather 
than unifying the agency.  
Difficulty in coordinating operations is one of the challenges faced by an 
organization without a common framework. This research, of course, focused on border 
security operations. The answers given on this subject were very blunt and given with a 
great deal of emotion, and appears to be a contentious issue within the organization. The 
problems identified included incongruent AOR boundaries, which make it logistically 
difficult to organize collaborative activities. As one senior leader stated very directly, “we 
are not one CBP when it comes to coordination.” Other complaints included the fact that 
CBP has varying capabilities, yet the component offices do not yet have congruent rules 
and authorities under which those capabilities can be exercised. One particular 
interviewee indicated that among the operational component offices of CBP, a sense of 




overlapping authorities and lanes cross very easily. He stated, “money follows credit and 
therefore credit becomes the goal of an operation rather than the security of the nation.” 
This is contrary to the edifice of collaboration. 
3. Theme #3: Guiding Principles for CBP 
The next key theme is that of guiding principles. As one participant stated, 
“fundamentally they are part of the problem—due to historic functions. We have non-
congruent policies with how to deal with a security threat. Ex: Use of Force.” The 
interviewee was referring to the new mission of CBP upon its creation, that of protecting 
the nation from terrorists and terrorist weapons. An illegal alien, even when a criminal, or 
a drug smuggler, is completely different from a terrorist. The objectives are different, and 
therefore, the legacy policies that guide CBP’s actions concerning law enforcement 
threats are not sufficient to handle a national or homeland security threat. This participant 
continues to state that the rules of engagement are significantly dissimilar. Instead of 
being reactive to an illicit border crossing, CBP should be proactive in deterring a 
terrorist threat. Many of the other participants answered along the same lines. The 
common themes seemed to form a thread.  
According to the participants, initially, as a guiding principle, CBP should use a 
risk management approach through defense in depth, while fully coordinating and 
integrating to neutralize the cause and effect. As an example, an OFO Officer’s actions 
can affect a situation in which a Border Patrol Agent or Air Interdiction Agent is later 
involved. It was largely agreed upon that coordination should be seen as a key guiding 
principle. Also mentioned were integrity, professionalism and a sense of honor and 
service, which are the core values for CBP as presented in its Strategic Plan. It is possible 
that these core values can be instilled in and expected of the employees of CBP, but they 
are not necessarily satisfactory as guiding principles. They do describe what CBP is at 
least in character, which may help to frame doctrine in the future, but would not suffice 
as stand-alone principles.  
These participant responses serve as evidence that a misinterpretation of what 
doctrinal guiding principles should be exists. Principles and values differ in that 
 42
principles are a personal or specific basis of conduct or management; in other words, a 
guiding sense of the requirements and obligations of correct conduct. Values are the 
ideals, customs, and institutions of a society toward which the people of the group have 
an affective regard; as such, are closely related to ethics as any object or quality desirable 
as a means or as an end in itself (dictionary.com, 2009). Values may guide the behavior 
of an individual but they are not authoritative; they are qualities that the organization 
would like for its employees to embrace. Guiding principles are the basis of reasoning 
and action for organizations to coordinate operations. Some examples from the draft DHS 
OPS Doctrine are Unity of effort, clear roles and relationships, inclusive horizontal and 
vertical coordination, flexibility in execution and maximum information sharing. The 
interviewees’ answers suggested they understood and supported what existed, but were 
not yet versed in the elements of doctrine, which is very different from what has already 
been done. There was a lot of the ‘what’ rather than the ‘how.’ Many participants gave 
answers, such as “defending the border” and “deny criminal organizations and 
terrorists…” or “applying the best resources we have to the biggest threat.” The question 
is then, how do the employees, as an organization, do these things? Is there a common 
approach, a best way? When these questions were asked, the answer was unequivocally, 
no, which has not yet been identified and implemented by the organization as a whole. 
4. Theme #4: Operating Concepts under the Guiding Principles 
The most relevant answer to the question of what operating concepts might be 
were stated as such, “even though the offices can appropriately work independently, they 
should still coordinate their operations so that when they need to work collectively, it is 
much easier to do.” Other participants struggled to identify with this concept and largely 
depended on their component office expertise for examples. One participant suggested as 
an operating concept; closing the gap between homeland defense and security. He 
continued to explain that to know what is going on in the larger terrorism picture, CBP 
must first work through the clutter that comprises most of the border security problem, 
and then eventually, be able to focus on what it is possible to do to negate the more 
significant threat—that of terrorism. A headquarters level manager, although not 
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executive level, also associated with his component office in stating; “OBP has the 
detect, identify, classify and respond mindset, I’m not sure what the others have,” which 
speaks volumes to the lack of intra-component knowledge and collaboration at least at 
the headquarters level. It may also suggest that other component offices either have not 
fully developed their strategies or they have not educated others in them. One part of an 
organization should familiarize itself with its neighbor stakeholder responsibilities.  
Evident throughout the study was differing ideas as to the guiding principles 
within the organization. This is a disturbing finding, as it seems that the executive leaders 
for CBP do not appear to agree on the organization’s guiding principles. Another 
concerning discovery was that a general inability to identify operating concepts 
supporting the guiding principles’ application exist. Thus, it is possible to infer either that 
it was not explained well enough or it is not something discussed within this 
organization. It was also somewhat difficult to identify with the larger CBP organization, 
and many times, if answered at all, the interviewees depended on the institutional 
knowledge of their respective offices rather than looking beyond or outside that 
knowledge. 
5. Theme #5: Lessons Learned 
A vital cog in the Engine of Change is the incorporation of lessons learned. It is 
beneficial for lessons learned to be located at one central collection point, as well as the 
people collecting them to have knowledge of field operations so that they can then 
provide direct feedback to doctrine developers. CBP does not possess a mechanism by 
which lessons learned are centrally collected, analyzed and then applied to existing 
strategies. Changes occur very slowly in the broader organization. One participant 
described the operational level use of lessons learned by stating: “operationally—hot 
washes are used; it is done on a small scale at the local level.” In addition, another 
participant stated that CBP has not been as disciplined in implementing findings—except 
for hurricane activity. The Lead Field Coordinator (LFC) function resulted from those 
lessons learned. Yet another participant admitted, “we don’t do this well as an 
organization”; referring to the collection and implementation of lessons learned. When 
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asked how CBP could incorporate lessons learned to keep the process going, one 
interviewee suggested that CBP ensure a rotation of senior leadership through different 
positions, both at headquarters and in the field, as well as through different component 
offices, which would be similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act to which the military is 
subject. For a soldier to be promoted to a particular level, it would be necessary to serve 
in a capacity different from the originating branch of the military. However, unless a 
particular leader is involved in the collection and implementation of lessons learned in 
particular, it is uncertain as to how the rotation of leaders affects this process. The value 
in the rotational assignments may be more applicable to gaining a better understanding or 
appreciation of the other functions of CBP. 
6. Theme #6: CBP’s Unity of Purpose 
To address the aspect of doctrine as a valuable instrument for CBP, the 
participants were asked to describe how the larger theoretical concept of doctrine could 
be used as a tool for establishing a unity of purpose within CBP and to provide their 
thoughts as to the value. The general consensus relied on leadership involvement, 
especially high level leaders. A leader that could conceptualize, sell, gain buy in and 
facilitate the entire process—a catalyst—was described as key to the long-term result. It 
was assumed by some participants that as long as there was high-level buy in, the concept 
should cascade down. One participant stated that CBP missed the opportunity at the 
merger to address the identity and unity concerns, and they are missing the opportunity 
now at the beginning of a person’s career, but that it was not too late to fix it. What unity 
of purpose can do is provide awareness for employees of whom they are as an agency and 
not just focus on their particular role, although with the understanding of how their role 
plays into the larger, broader view. 
The conversations then turned to the foundational role of doctrine to 
institutionalize standard roles and procedures. The participants were asked to identify 
whether this would benefit CBP. The common theme running throughout the interviews 
was, “it is an area that we don’t do a very good job in right now.” One participant made a 
very fundamental statement, “the value is in achieving more than we are now.” The 
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general consensus centered on the belief that anything would be better than what exists 
today. The next question then was how this could be done and how training might be 
used as a vehicle for incorporating the institutionalized roles and practices. It is known 
throughout the government that certain training exercises are not well received and not 
respected. It boils down to going through the motions. These exercises are not taken 
seriously, and therefore, the original intent of the training is lost. For doctrine, changes to 
doctrine and implementation of doctrine to be accepted, one participant suggested that 
when the employees can see the outcome of their efforts, both from an organizational 
level and from their perspective, it is then possible to gain their support. By giving them 
evidence that their efforts are achieving a greater good, it cultivates a consciousness of 
the bigger picture. This learning is beneficial in leadership development in that it 
communicates the organization’s intent and describes a person’s role in achieving the 
desired end state. The participants also agreed that training must be a sustained effort. 
The organization experiences a large amount of turn over and progression. For the 
process to have value, it must be sustainable and meaningful. 
Finally, the participants were asked as to whether they believed there was value in 
doctrine for border security. The answer was a solid yes. The participants continued to 
explain that this organization is in need of something to sustain it. One participant 
suggested that it not possible to ever go wrong by thinking about the science, the theory. 
He continued to state that doctrine is an equation to define a system. His description very 
closely resembled Petraeus’ Engine of change. He continued to say, “doctrine is like a 
system with moving parts, each of which has to be working in synergy with one another 
for the whole system to function. The underlying principles of how things work is 
defined in the numbers and you can’t make the systems better or different without 
understanding the science. Doctrine is what describes how those things best work on their 




E. CONFUSION AMONG US 
The major themes identified centered on the interview questions, which are major 
organizational challenges for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP’s Common 
Conceptual Framework, Guiding Principles for CBP, Operating Concepts under the 
Guiding Principles, Lessons Learned, and CBP’s Unity of Purpose.  
Although the research focused on the perspective from the broader border security 
view, the respondents still referenced their most comfortable and expert experience. The 
interviewees clearly held different views regarding what border security meant within 
their specific offices’ role. Thus, it was evident that there was not much unified border 
security experience from which to draw. This situation gives validity to the social identity 
theory. Each individual identified with the group with the most commonality to them. 
When looking outside that group, they did not appear to grasp the commonality as much, 
and as such, were very protective of and reliant on their individual offices’ identity.  
F. ANALYSIS 
There are efforts within DHS to develop different levels of doctrine. The United 
States Coast Guard (USCG), DHS Operations Coordination and Planning Directorate 
(OPS) and FEMA Operations are a few of the known agencies that have recently 
developed or revamped their doctrinal documents. This poses the question whether this is 
becoming a trend within DHS or whether there is an express need for doctrine throughout 
the organization. One inference drawn from this knowledge is that because both DHS and 
CBP are new with regard to the combination of stakeholders within both organizations, 
and the fact that both were created in an incredibly short amount of time, an express need 
exists for a coordinated and unifying effort, which results in a product that is adopted by 
their components, to recognize, institutionalize and codify common ground.  
CBP senior executives are currently engaged in a leadership development effort 
entitled CBP’s Future State Initiative. According to one Assistant Commissioner 
interviewed within CBP, eight future state initiatives have been identified for further 
development and consideration, which include CBP’s organizational alignment, common 
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office/common campus, air and marine mission, building a leadership team for the future, 
long-term impact of border patrol expansion, mission integration, training for the future 
and institutionalizing CBP’s Guiding Principles. These topics identified throughout this 
study are regarded as broken, even still. The Mission Integration effort mirrors many of 
the same aspects of the function of doctrine. In doctrine development, however, all levels 
of employee input are considered and involved. The current mission integration project 
involves only senior executive leaders at the headquarters level. As identified by the 
mission integration team, a great need for unified CBP policies exists, which was also 
identified by the participants of this study.  
Regarding the guiding principles initiative, the hope exists for it to be adopted by 
CBP component offices. However, no function is built in to measure or teach the 
implementation of the principles or to codify and institutionalize them. Even though the 
future state initiatives included several of the same executives interviewed for this study, 
they did not identify with the developed guiding principles when asked what the guiding 
principles of CBP would include.  
Many of the initiatives will take a great deal of time to implement, although the 
benefits are thought to outweigh the costs. For example, co-location of CBP offices in a 
campus-type setting would likely increase the efficient use of facility space, which is 
lacking and expensive, and seek to encourage cooperation between CBP component 
offices. Yet, it is necessary to consider certain issues with existing policies, practices and 
plans for each of the initiatives. Having worked in CBP since its beginning and prior to 
the merger, the author is confident these efforts will experience significant dissention, as 
change is difficult; especially, without clarity in intent and a socialization of the concepts 
before they are enacted. This issue is particularly evident when considering the issues still 
faced by CBP’s component offices as demonstrated in the interview results. The missing 
link in the future initiatives effort is the operators; those who will be affected the most by 
changes. Significant changes, such as these, must include all levels of the organization. 
People and consideration of cultures is of utmost importance because although the merger 
is six years old, these matters were not considered in 2003. Thus, to fix the problem, late 
consideration is better than never.  
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As introduced previously, General Petraus’ Engine of Change diagram describes a 
learning organization as a system, or an engine. All of the parts or cogs of the system 
must be working in synchronization for the engine to perform correctly. The parts or cogs 
of the engine include doctrine (theory), leader development (understanding), collective 
training (application) and lessons learned (feedback).  
This change process enables an organization to become a learning organization, 
always changing and adapting. The design of a learning organization is that the learning 
and development processes do not have to be top down in application. There are 
initiatives that occur at the tactical level, and on occasion, their same concepts can be 
applied at the organizational level. The important factor in the development process is to 
include individuals from all levels within an organization. The military has embraced this 
theory and included generals, field commanders and doctrine developers when 
considering change. Practical information is obtained from those who are currently or 
have recently experienced tactical level involvement. The majority of experience, good 
ideas and best practices do not reside in the headquarters office building. An organization 
must leverage all of its assets.  
The application of systems thinking to CBP is that the organization cannot 
transform into a synchronized system until significant improvements are made. Arguably, 
the weakest part of the system for CBP is in doctrine; however, advances must be made 
in all areas before CBP would be suited to begin doctrine development.  
With doctrine, survival does occur from one administration to the next. In a 
highly political environment, such as the one in which CBP is situated, this is a critical 
factor for survival of the organization over time. Changing doctrine requires recognition 
of a break down in one of the cogs; it is not done at the whim of a regime change. 
Doctrine seeks to institutionalize best practices and provide a foundation for an 
organization. With the expectation of a new commissioner for CBP, anything currently 
ongoing may be halted as was done with the activities under review for DHS. When 
Secretary Napolitano became head of the department, she initiated a major policy and 
strategy review, which has essentially stalled a large majority of ongoing efforts.  
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In practice, the offices within CBP generally work well together at the tactical 
level, as evidenced by the many unified efforts that have and are currently occurring. One 
example is the San Diego sector’s maritime enforcement effort. This is a combined effort 
among not only CBP offices, but also other components within DHS. The direction for 
this effort is predicated on the DHS strategic goals of awareness, prevention, protection 
and organizational excellence through partnerships (DHS, 2004). The goal of this 
strategy is to unite the fundamental principles that guide the full range of response 
activities and capabilities present within each sect of the department in this particular 
geographic area. Agencies commonly bound by traditional organizational boundaries also 
share common responsibilities—DHS San Diego components share responsibility for 
maritime threats.  
The collaborative team focuses its efforts on achieving the following strategic 
goals of establishing and employing a common threat based operational picture; 
establishing intelligence fusion through interagency intelligence sharing and 
collaboration; identifying and supporting interagency resource requirements and new 
technology necessary to accomplish missions; supporting and participating in interagency 
planning; and identifying and implementing joint training opportunities.  
The overarching goal in this strategy is to allocate the resources that cover the 
participant agencies’ inter-related requirements, and as such, enable the development of 
planning that addresses recognized common threats. These partnerships further refine and 
enhance the ability of the participating agencies to respond effectively to a significant 
event within the San Diego area.  
Throughout the collaborative effort, it is essential that leadership, trust and an 
understanding of each organizational culture be recognized so that the working 
relationship can be sustained and enhanced. This conglomeration of agencies is managed 
by the San Diego DHS Senior Guidance team, which includes five senior level executives 
from the USCG, CBP/OBP, CBP/A&M (two: one air and one Marine), and Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement Office of Investigations (ICE OI). The agencies meet on a 
regular basis and develop operations plans that integrate each of the participants’ 
activities and resources. This has been a successful ongoing effort since 2007.  
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The difference between field level and headquarters level activities is, in large 
part, relationship and ego based. The field level operators have common 
interdependencies, and while they are implementing higher-level strategies, they have 
found a way to work through their differences. A sharing of command, resources and 
intelligence on a daily basis exists. In other words, the right hand knows what the left is 
doing and they can coordinate activities and avoid redundancy while at the same time 
multiplying their effectiveness.  
The overarching theme of the questioning and research was to identify doctrine 
would have value for border security, for CBP. Clearly, the answer is yes. There was, 
nonetheless, a general consensus that “we are not there yet,” meaning that although there 
is a recognized need to have a unified and common perspective, CBP as an organization, 
has not yet accomplished that task.  
It is inherently difficult for people to change, and resistance to change quite often 
undermines a potentially valuable effort. Dissention among the ranks has become an 
issue. It is incredibly important to get to the root cause of dissention within an 
organization and then deal with the issues as appropriate. For example, while working on 
a project, one stakeholder may come to a meeting with the attitude of just not liking the 
concept of whatever is being discussing. If asked, “Why don’t you like it?” and the 
answer is that it costs too much money, or it is too hard, it will take too long, then it is up 
to the leaders or facilitator of the project to make the value clear to the stakeholder. It 
takes both time and effort for many people to come around to new or different ideas. 
There are instances in which the dissention cannot be dispelled. Nonetheless, it is crucial 
to get to the root of the issues, and hopefully, make the contributors comfortable. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this study was to examine the value and application of doctrine for 
border security, specifically for U.S. Customs and Border Protection and to determine 
how CBP can become a learning organization, which then has the capacity to approach 
the development of common overarching doctrine properly. Through interviews and 
other research activities, such as reviewing and analyzing available literature and 
doctrinal documents, this thesis has argued that the process under which doctrine is 
created and the result of that process; the codification and institutionalization of the best 
practices for CBP as a whole would be of great value to the organization.  
No effort to develop doctrine for CBP as an organization has been undertaken. 
CBP must meet particular milestones before beginning the process of developing 
doctrine. It seems that currently, CBP is not ready, as it has yet become amalgamated in 
their missions or policies, which are necessary steps before developing doctrine. As 
evidenced in many of the interviews, the organization is fragmented, missions and 
policies are not integrated, and to develop doctrine, a common conceptual framework, 
these issues must first be tackled. The question, then, is how can this be done? Where is 
the starting point?  
Senge (1990, p. 484) explains that people are taught to break apart problems or 
fragment the world to make tasks more manageable. When things or organizations are 
fragmented, it is difficult to see the consequences of individual actions. The connection to 
the larger whole is lost. David Bohm (1990) stated, “when we try to see the bigger 
picture, it is much like reassembling the fragments of a broken mirror to see a true 
reflection… when we give up this illusion, we can then build learning organizations;” an 
organization in which its people continually expand their capacity to create the results 
they truly desire. According to the learning organization concept, organizations that are to 
excel in the future will be those that tap into their people’s commitment and capacity to 
learn at all levels. CBP must tap into their components commitments to the larger 
organization and leverage those commitments to create a wholly effective agency. 
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General Petraeus’ Engine of Change describes a learning organization as one in which 
doctrine is a fundamental part of the system. In addition, the Engine of Change has a 
component for leadership development or training. At this point, the doctrine is codified 
and taught to the organization. CBP is not currently structured to teach its strategies or 
policies in any manner. After the academy, little training occurs beyond first level 
supervisory training, which is limited in scope and contains very little about CBP as an 
organization. Leadership training is primarily reserved for upper management (GS-14 
and above) and is very competitive and there is no guarantee it will positively affect a 
career. No established career path exists for an employee to follow to obtain a certain 
level. It is not entirely possible to know where the choices made will lead within the 
organization.  
On another point, it is clear that CBP, out of need, rather than obligation, must be 
collaborative. Does everyone always win when collaborating? Not necessarily, but 
collaboration is critical to success when an organization has significant 
interdependencies, overlapping responsibilities, mutual interests and a common mission. 
An interest is not the same as a position. One component office can support its interests 
while also accommodating another’s interests through collaboration. Successful 
collaboration depends on many factors. One of the most important prerequisites for 
collaboration to be successful is the presence of a catalyst. This concept is discussed by 
Ricardo S. Morse, PhD, in his article, developing public leaders in an age of 
collaborative governance (2007), as well as in the Starfish and the spider literature, in 
that a catalyst is a person who can move along a process, whether centralized or not, and 
then assist in making it successful. CBP interviewees agreed that change must be ushered 
along, with top-level buy in. A catalyst can assist in gaining both top-level and field-level 
cooperation.  
According to Morse (2007), to make collaborative efforts successful, leaders must 
build support both of and from the larger group. They must persevere in their efforts and 
dispel misperceptions. He describes several leadership attributes and characteristics from 
a number of sources that lead to a successful collaborative leader. One such attribute is 
that of systems thinking. Systems thinking involves thinking about impacts on the future, 
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thinking about ripple effects and consequences beyond what is immediately concerning, 
and thinking in terms of issues and strategies that cross functions, specialties and 
professional disciplines (Luke, 1998, p. 222). This concept is a direct parallel with the 
considerations of CBP in becoming a learning organization that engages in multiple 
collaborative efforts.  
Morse (2007) also suggests that it is crucial to institutionalize the collaboration 
appropriately and build a network to maintain and strengthen the commitment beyond the 
existing stakeholders, i.e., succession planning. At this point, doctrine fits into the 
equation. Learning organizations discuss a network or systems approach as a “discipline 
for seeing wholes” (Senge, 1990, p. 486). Senge continues to describe how businesses 
and human endeavors are also systems, that “you can only understand the system of a 
rainstorm by contemplating it as a whole.” Systems thinking itself is considered a 
conceptual framework—one that has been developed over many years to explain patterns 
and help in learning how to change them effectively. It is only possible to understand the 
full application of CBP when contemplating it as a whole. What does CBP stand for, how 
do they accomplish their tasks and who leads them to the goal line? 
Another critical collaborative leadership behavior or attribute according to Morse 
(2007, p. 11) is the ability to facilitate trusting relationships among partners or 
stakeholders. Collaboration it would seem is dependent upon trust. Participation must be 
between trusted individuals who have both the authority and knowledge to speak for an 
organization. When the people around you are both credible and competent, then trust is 
nearly automatic.  
Arguably, trust within an organization is vital in establishing systems and working 
together toward a common goal, in this case the security of the American people. Steven 
M. R. Covey introduced in his book, The speed of trust, the concept that levels of trust 
have either taxes or dividends within an organization. The lower the level of trust, the 
higher the tax on productivity and conversely, the higher the level of trust, the more 
dividends are experienced with a result of higher productivity at a lower cost—the cost 
being beyond monetary. An organization can have a strong strategy and the ability to 
execute it, but without trust, the net result can be either destroyed by a low-trust tax or 
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multiplied by a high-trust dividend. Evidence of this exists in CBP in the competition for 
resources, as well as operations and credit for those operations mentioned during the 
interviews.  
CBP can be characterized with regard to a trust tax, and based on the research for 
this thesis, as having an incredible amount of bureaucracy and redundancy in systems and 
structures, hidden agendas, unnecessary hierarchy, incredibly slow approvals, and most 
of all, misaligned systems and structures all of which result in dissatisfied employees and 
stakeholders (Covey, 2008). The question remains then, how can they rebuild or in most 
cases, just build trust between the component offices so that working together is a 
positive experience with a positive outcome? According to Covey (p. 36), most people 
have the ability to restore trust. Understanding intent is a key factor in rebuilding trust. 
Walk the talk, talk straight, make intentions clear and leave agendas at the door; these are 
a few of his suggestions in building or rebuilding trust. Leaders must lead, be 
accountable, admit their mistakes, move on and follow through—the same can be said for 
those not in leadership positions, per se. Leaders are present at all levels within the 
organization. The current situation within CBP does not foster trusting relationships, 
partly because no doctrine exists and partly because there is a struggle for control, each of 
which feed on the other. With doctrine, the organization would have clear roles and 
responsibilities, clear authorities, clear areas of responsibility and a common framework 
from which to draw.  
Author Peter Senge (1998, pp. 486–487) describes several disciplines, or 
“technologies” of a learning organization, systems thinking, personal mastery, mental 
model, and building shared vision. He asserts that the one of the disciplines, the Fifth 
Discipline as he calls it, is that of systems thinking. The discipline integrates all of the 
rest. Systems thinking keeps the other disciplines fused together so they are coherently 
used and understood.  
According to Senge (1990, p. 490), systems thinking requires the other disciplines 
to reach its true potential. Building shared vision promotes an obligation to the long term. 
Mental models focus on the openness needed to realize inefficiencies in current 
viewpoints. Team learning develops the skills of the larger group of people to seek the 
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larger picture, which is beyond personal perspective. Systems thinking puts into 
perspective the subtle aspects of a learning organization for the individual, who realizes 
there is something larger, yet is a part of what makes it work. This is the heart of the 
learning organization—the realization that individuals are connected to the world, not 
separated from it. The realization of interconnectedness, that not all of the organizations’ 
problems are from outside, but also come from actions that individuals take. It is cause 
and effect. The choices made today do affect tomorrow and they do affect more than just 
individuals; be it individual component offices or individual people.  
Few organizations have sustained themselves without a shared vision, without 
goals, without common mission or shared values. Successful learning organizations have 
had the ability to instill throughout their workforce a deeply shared common identity and 
concern for the organizations future.  
An expressive need exists for CBP to become a learning organization, an 
organization whose people continually develop their aptitude to create the results they 
truly aspire to, where new and open thinking is cultivated, and where people are 
continually learning how to learn together. There are no simple answers or shortcuts to 
accomplish this task. The challenge for the organization is that this requires imagination, 
perseverance, dialogue, profound caring and a willingness to change. CBP must also 
learn to use collaboration to its fullest effective extent, and not just for collaboration’s 
sake, but to gain results, to reach outcomes rather than outputs.  
Being part of a learning organization requires one thing in particular to be 
effective—Metanoia—a shift of mind. Senge describes this as an awakening of shared 
intuition and direct knowing of the highest. Metanoia describes the quintessential 
paradigm shift where a person moves convulsively from one understanding to something 
completely different. It has also been described as a profound transformation, a change at 
the innermost core (Burke, 2008). Metanoia is beyond what most people consider 
learning to be. Learning has become synonymous with taking in information, but really 
learning something requires a fundamental shift in mind; a movement toward knowing; 
an ah-ha moment. It is possible to read a book about a topic, for instance, on how to ice 
skate, but a person has not truly learned how to ice skate until able to do it.  
 56
Then, there is the factor of trust. Without it, any process can be slow and arduous; 
with it, processes move faster and goals are accomplished. According to Covey (2008), 
when working with trusted individuals, it is much easier to take their efforts at face value, 
and thus, minimizing bureaucracy. Covey (2008, p. 1) also asserts that trust is the one 
thing, that if not present or removed, can destroy the most powerful of anything, be it a 
relationship, a business or a government. How is it possible then to trust someone who is 
trying to undermine an individual or go behind his or her back? Those types of people 
cannot be trusted. One reason for this undermining within CBP is the lack of the 
institutionalization of clear roles and responsibilities. For example, CBP OAM has a 
support responsibility to CBP component offices, as well as other agencies within DHS; 
however, there is a struggle ongoing for OAM to become its own operational component 
with more of a proactive enforcement role. Nevertheless, they are depended upon to 
support the enforcement components. The Border Patrol Sector Chiefs maintain tactical 
control of the air assets located within their sectors, yet are frequently at odds with those 
in physical control of these assets for various reasons, including other missions they are 
requested to perform. 
A. FINAL THOUGHTS  
The differences that can be realized upon the completion of and throughout the 
process of improving CBP not being achieved today are mission integration, 
standardization, operational integration, establishing clear roles and responsibilities, trust 
between components of CBP, learning as an organization, unity of purpose, 
indoctrination, and defining fundamental principles. This last chapter proposes a set of 
recommendations leading to the successful adoption of these innovations.  
Why doctrine? Doctrine answers not only the what, but also the how, to include 
the following: Why does an organization exist an entity? What is the focus and how to 
achieve the goals? How to behave as an organization? What is the best way to do that?  
Doctrine is an equation to define a system—a system with moving parts, each of 
which has to be working in synergy with one another for the whole system to function. 
Systems thinking is key to developing into an organization that can learn from itself and 
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others. Becoming a learning organization that is practiced and successful in collaboration 
would enable the offices within CBP to integrate policies and strategies based on a 
common approach and set of principles as opposed to maintaining their independent 
status quo, in which CBP components continue to follow legacy approaches and policies 
that predate their amalgamation into one agency. General Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of 
Staff, USAF (1996) during the Air Force Air and Space Doctrine Symposium, Maxwell 
AFB, Alabama, stated, “while doctrine can be useful in intellectual debates and can 
provide a valid input for future force programming, its primary purpose should be to 
guide (author’s emphasis)…its real value lies in providing our people a coherent 
framework (author’s emphasis)….”  
Failure to create a common framework that rationalizes the wide variety of 
policies, procedures and strategies among the offices within CBP will likely result in the 
continuation of a fragmented agency unable to accomplish the increasingly important 
mission of border security.  
It is not the intent of this thesis to recommend the component offices of CBP 
should in any way lose or renounce their individual identities. Those identities possess 
many aspects, however, that are common. The very nature of the organization is 
interdependent and collaborative. Not one component of CBP can possibly perform all 
the tasks and assignments for which CBP is responsible. The component offices are 
subject to laws that determine their authorities. OFO can only perform their law 
enforcement functions at the Ports of Entry, unless it can verify a nexus to the border. 
Conversely, the laws governing the Border Patrol Agents’ authorities allow them to 
perform their functions between the Ports of Entry and throughout the U.S. Everyone is 
working toward the same goal—that of securing America’s borders. This can be done 
much more efficiently and effectively through collaborative effort. It has been said that it 
is not the product but the process that is most valuable. In other words, those engaged in 
the collaborative formation of a common project learn a great deal about their 
organization as a whole, its gaps, and its interdependencies and how one component can 
compliment the others.  
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The problem with doctrine when it is meant to apply to a large group of people is 
that people do not all believe the same thing. They can read the same material, have 
similar experiences, and arrive at different conclusions. The problem amplifies itself 
when dealing with people who have not been taught the same lessons or experienced 
similar circumstances. People come from different backgrounds and experience different 
life lessons, yet when given the opportunity and with an open mind, strong leadership and 
a shared vision, they can agree on basic fundamental ideas that shape their organization.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE AREAS OF STUDY 
DHS’ San Diego area Senior Guidance Team construct could serve as a model for 
how to apply unified command and operational synergy to the headquarters element of 
CBP. They have developed a task force with initiatives and actions that insure 
effectiveness while eliminating duplicative effort. San Diego has also introduced a border 
security doctrine that contains overarching principles and is predicated on targeted 
enforcement, operational discipline, and above all, unity of command.  
It is the recommendation of the author that CBP designate a specific division or 
section for integration purposes. This effort is essential for the organization to develop 
synergy. The Engine of Change model should be applied to CBP for this development 
process. If CBP took this model and began to use it, several things would have to happen. 
Organizationally, a training structure needs to be developed to support the codification of 
the doctrine. The level at which this training should occur is at the very beginning of the 
supervisory ladder. It is important for ground troops also to understand their 
organizations foundational ideology as well, which can be introduced at the academies on 
a basic level. No secondary or “officer” level training is available within the agency. The 
USCG has an Officer Candidate School, which prepares candidates to serve effectively as 
officers in the USCG. Applicants must be in their senior year at, or hold a baccalaureate 
or higher degree, from an accredited college or university (uscg.edu, 2009). CBP only 
requires a specified amount of time in service and a qualifying score on the promotional 
assessment test to advance to a management position. The advent of this sort of 
management school would promote higher education among CBP employees, and while 
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it is not necessary to have the same requirements as the USCG, but in an effort to be 
more competitive later at higher levels within the Department, it would certainly be 
beneficial. It is recommended that CBP research the development of this sort of 
opportunity for its mid level managers.  
Also, the organization would need to develop an entity that collects, organizes and 
creates lessons learned for the component offices. This would also assist in determining 
best practices, and thus, the cycle continues. This office or section may also benefit from 
instruction in becoming a learning organization, as well as doctrine development. The 
department is currently engaged in doctrinal development and may serve as a subject 
matter expert for CBP if requested. The division or section could be located in the Office 
of Intelligence and Operations Coordination as this is already an interdisciplinary office 
within CBP; however, it must include operational components as well as administrative 
components, from senior level executives to operators from the field level. The assigned 
personnel must have intricate knowledge of the internal functions of the organization that 
is CBP and a broad perspective with vision, as well as practical experience. The 
participants should start with the disjointed and non-complimentary policies and 
structures within the organization; for example, overtime pay, retirement systems and the 
area of responsibility (AOR) alignment (sectors vs. field offices). This effort requires a 
fundamental policy review for the organization.  
Future areas of study include doctrine development, succession planning to 
continue the effort, as well as an effort to examine the training and implementation 
functions of doctrine. CBP is not currently structured so that training of doctrine, policy 
or strategy is easily facilitated. It could most practically be introduced at the basic 






Border security doctrine would serve as a set of guiding principles for agencies 
and offices with border security responsibilities and enable each individual agency to 
benefit from the actions of the others. In doing so, they provide for the American people a 
finer sense of overall homeland security in that the citizens of this country can be 
confident that their border enforcement operations are working with synergy to support 
one another and provide the blanket of security that America sleeps under each night. 
Learning is not attained by chance; it must be sought for with ardor and 




“Doctrine” encompasses the fundamental principles that guide and organization and 
shape its efforts. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. Doctrine 
influences how policy and plans are developed and carried out, how departments and 
agencies are organized and trained, and how equipment is procured. It promotes unity of 
purpose, guides professional judgment, and enables responders to best fulfill their 
responsibilities. Doctrine links theory, experience, experimentation and practice.  
 
1. What do you see as the major organizational challenges today in Border Security? 
a. Operational Challenges? 
i. Is there a connection between those, please explain. 
 
2. Does CBP currently have a common conceptual framework? Please explain. 
 
3. Guiding principles provide a framework for how multiple organizations achieve 
unified, collective action. They are the basis of reasoning and action.  
a. Describe guiding principle for Border Security. 
 
4. Is it important to codify those principles,  
a. To institutionalize them? 
 
5. Operating concepts are the means by which the Guiding principles are applied. 
a. Describe operating concepts for Border Security. 
 
6. Doctrine is created in large part by applying lessons learned from real life, 
field/tactical experiences. How can this be done in the construct of Border 
security? 
a. Is there currently a method for collecting lessons learned, applying them to 
existing strategies and policy and making changes while also 
institutionalizing them? 
 
7. Could doctrine serve in helping to institutionalize standard roles and procedures 
among CBP components? Please explain. 
 
8. Could doctrine assist in establishing unity of purpose on a macro level among 
CBP employees? Please explain. 
 
9. Describe some challenges in coordinating Border Security Operations.  
 
10. Do you see value in doctrine for Border Security? 
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